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1Hoist with their Own Petard?
Forthcoming 17 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER ___ (October 2004)
Steven L. Chanenson
In 2003, Congress and the Department of Justice tried to increase their control 
over the United States Sentencing Commission and federal sentencing generally.  
Congress appeared to have achieved this goal when it passed the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 
(“PROTECT Act”),1 which resulted in reduced grounds for downward departures, 
Congressionally-revised text of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and a constrained 
Sentencing Commission potentially devoid of judges.  Yet pro-government 
interpretations of the PROTECT Act may have been premature because the Supreme 
Court has now struck down parts of Washington State’s legislatively-enacted sentencing 
guidelines in Blakely v. Washington.2  In an effort to save the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines from Blakely’s grasp, the Department of Justice has emphasized that they 
are administratively enacted, in contrast to Washington’s legislatively-enacted 
guidelines.  As a factual matter, however, the PROTECT Act blurred the federal 
administrative versus legislative distinction.  Thus, Congress and the Department – the 
architects of the PROTECT Act – may find themselves hoist with their own petard.
 Editor, FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER; Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University 
School of Law.  The author thanks Douglas Berman, Dan Freed, Paul Hofer, Marc Miller, and Michael 
Mulroney for their wise advice and counsel, and Amanda Dovidio and Marchelle Thomson for their 
excellent research assistance.
1 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 667 (April 30, 2003).
2 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2I.  Introduction
Blakely v. Washington is the case that launched a thousand quips – as well as 
plenty of metaphors, clichés, and knotty legal questions.  Many thought that it was just 
supposed to be the final step limiting the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s 
controversial 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.3  Instead, Blakely invalidated a 
key aspect of Washington’s sentencing guidelines and delivered a body blow that has 
dazed American criminal justice systems generally.  
Blakely concluded that Washington’s legislatively-enacted sentencing guidelines 
ranges created so-called “statutory maximums” that can only be transcended based on a 
jury’s factual finding (or a defendant’s admission) of an aggravating factor, irrespective 
of the higher, traditional statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.  Thus, the 
state trial judge in Blakely should not have imposed a sentence above the presumptive 
sentencing range based on judicially-found facts.
What about the federal system?  The Blakely Court expressly left that question 
open.  Defenders of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines point to ways in which these 
Guidelines differ from the Washington State guidelines at issue in Blakely.  They note 
that, unlike the Washington State guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not 
statutes passed by Congress, but rather are administratively issued by an independent 
Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch.4
3 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, United States v. 
Blakely, No. 02-1632, 2004 WL 177025, at *9.
3Nevertheless, by passing the PROTECT Act, Congress – with the support of the 
Department of Justice – may have given the Court extra ammunition to discount these 
distinctions and perhaps invalidate part or all of the Guidelines.  Congress undermined 
the administrative character of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when it adopted the 
PROTECT Act, which directly amended the Guidelines text, restricted the power of the 
United States Sentencing Commission, and diminished the role of federal judges.  
Providing what was then-perceived as a tactical advantage for the government, the 
PROTECT Act decreased both the Commission’s involvement in setting sentencing 
policy, and the judges’ discretion in setting specific sentences.  In the process, however, 
Congress and the Department may well have inadvertently helped to destroy the very 
system they were trying to dominate.
II.  Life in Blakely’s Wake
In a few short weeks, Blakely has “discombobulate[d] the whole criminal-law 
docket”5 in federal courts across the country.  Blakely is one of the most, if not the most, 
significant constitutional criminal procedure decisions in generations.6  Arguably, 
Blakely changed the entire landscape of criminal sentencing in the United States, but it 
did so in an opaque manner.  Several basic questions remain.  To what kind of system 
does Blakely apply?  Does it invalidate all of an affected system or just part of it?  
5 United States v. Booker, No. 03-4225, 2004 WL 1535858, at *11 (7th Cir. July 9, 2004) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
6 Professor Douglas Berman has gone even further and argued that “Blakely is the biggest criminal 
justice decision not just of this past term, not just of this decade, not just of the Rehnquist Court, but 
perhaps in the history of the Supreme Court.”  Douglas Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4, 
SLATE, July 16, 2004, available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2104014.
4Answers to these and a myriad of other questions are, at present, elusive.  In fact, as of 
this writing in early August 2004, it may be better to think of Blakely as casting a dark 
storm cloud over virtually all determinate sentencing guidelines systems.  Which 
guideline systems get the rain and which do not remains to be seen.
Apprendi required every fact that increases an individual’s statutory maximum 
sentence – other than the fact of prior conviction – to be proven to the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.7  Despite claims that Apprendi could spark the downfall of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines,8 the lower federal courts uniformly concluded that when 
the Supreme Court said “statutory maximum” it actually meant the legislatively-
imposed statutory maximum for the grade of the conviction offense.9  Furthermore, 
several commentators thought that the Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Harris v. 
United States,10 upholding the use of mandatory minimums against an Apprendi attack, 
had removed the sword of Damocles that had been hanging over the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines since Apprendi.11  Accordingly, many people were taken by surprise when 
7 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
8 See, e.g., Jane A. Dall, Note, “‘A Question for Another Day’: The Constitutionality of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1617, 1618 (2003) (“A 
broad reading of the Apprendi rationale prompts questions as to the constitutionality of sentencing under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.”); Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 797 (2002) (“Apprendi will initiate the demise of 
guidelines sentencing”).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Meritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Parmelee, 319 F.3d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1039 (11th Cir. 
2003).
10 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (reaffirming McMillan v. Pennsylvania and holding that judges may 
find facts at a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt to support a mandatory minimum); see also
id. at 570 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join [the majority’s] opinion 
to the extent that it holds that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory minimums.”).
11 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending 
Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 79, 79 (2002) (“The upshot is that Apprendi, 
5the Blakely Court struck down parts of the Washington State sentencing guidelines as 
violative of the Sixth Amendment.12
Blakely held that Washington’s legislatively-enacted, presumptive guideline 
ranges were themselves “statutory maximums” that can only be exceeded based on a 
jury’s authorization (or a defendant’s admission).  Although the traditional statutory 
maximum for the grade of the offense involved was higher, the Court concluded that a 
jury needed to find all facts necessary to increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the 
presumptive guideline range.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Blakely thus turns, in large part, on his 
definition of “statutory maximum.”  He stated that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on t he basis of 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 13  Justice Scalia 
went on to note that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose 
without any additional findings.”14  Despite the fact that no sentencing guidelines
system of which I am aware was ever created with the intention of establishing a 
controlling, silent statutory sub-maximum, Justice Scalia viewed Washington’s 
sentencing guidelines as doing just that.  
which once threatened the sentencing guidelines and the national trend toward determinate sentencing, is 
now a caged tiger.”).
12 Cf. Tony Mauro, The “Sleeper” Cases with the Wide Ripple Effect, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 2004 
(“This term’s Supreme Court ruling that may have the broadest impact was on few radar screens before it 
was announced June 24: Blakely v. Washington, which could upend federal and state sentencing laws 
nationwide.”).
13 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
14 Id.
6Unlike the federal Sentencing Reform Act, which delegated specific guideline 
creation to the United States Sentencing Commission,15 the Washington Sentencing 
Reform Act directly provided for “presumptive sentencing ranges.”16  Although Blakely
was written against the backdrop of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Justice Scalia 
dispensed with them in an already-famous footnote:  “The Federal Guidelines are not 
before us, and we express no opinion on them.”17
In the initial days and weeks after Blakely, the lower federal courts split over 
whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines survived.18  At first, the majority of the 
circuits held that Blakely invalidates at least the full use of the Guidelines in those cases 
where facts must be found to increase a defendant’s guideline range.  The various 
resolutions of the resulting severability questions were even more fractured.  
Twenty-seven days after the Court decided Blakely, the United States filed two 
petitions for certiorari in Guidelines cases and requested expedited briefing.  The 
government asked the Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Booker,19 in which a divided panel struck down the Guidelines when they required a 
judge to find facts to increase a defendant’s sentencing range but remanded on the 
15 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (“The Constitution's structural protections 
do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the 
intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is 
present here.”).
16 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 et seq. (1997).
17 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538, n.9.  Justice O’Connor appeared to believe that this approach missed 
the point.  See, e.g., id. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is no answer to say that today’s opinion 
impacts only Washington’s scheme and not others, such as, for example, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.”).
18 Compare United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1535858 (7th Cir.  2004) (finding federal guidelines 
unconstitutional), with United States v. Pineiro, 2004 WL 1543170 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding federal 
guidelines constitutional).
19 United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1535858 (7th Cir.  2004).
7question of severability, and a similar District of Maine decision in United States v. 
Fanfan,20 in which the trial judge found that the Guidelines violated Blakely.  On 
August 2, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in those two cases, and so will 
squarely address the question of whether Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.21  It is considerably less clear that the Supreme Court will fully address the 
tangled severability questions.  If Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
how much of the federal system will be invalidated?  The severability issues, though 
complex, are narrowly framed in the government’s questions presented, which the 
Court adopted.22
20 United States v. Fanfan, 04-47-P- H (D. Maine) (June 28, 2004).
21 United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1713654 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1713655 
(2004).
22 The government simply asks the Court to address whether the Guidelines should be applied in a 
truncated form (i.e., without upward adjustment but in all other respects) or abandoned (i.e., allowing 
judges to sentence anywhere within the statutory range for the offense of conviction) in cases where the 
Guidelines would call for a judge to find a fact that increases the defendant’s guideline range.  United 
States v. Booker,  No. 04-104, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I (“whether, in a case in which the 
Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines as a 
whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that the sentencing court must 
exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for the 
offense of conviction.”).  Fanfan’s reformulated question presented would have cast a wider net.  United 
States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105, Brief in Opposition at I (“What role do the Sentencing Reform Act, the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 continue to play in federal criminal 
sentencing?”).  A District Court in Orlando has highlighted a concern that may follow from the 
government’s narrow approach and observed that the “suggestion that courts use the Guidelines in some 
cases but not others is at best schizophrenic and at worst contrary to the basic principles of justice, 
practicality, fairness, due process, and equal protection.”  United States v. King, No. 6:04-cr-35-Orl-
31KRS, Sentencing Memorandum Opinion, Slip-op at 14 (July 19, 2004); see also id. (“Such a structure 
not only seems to violate equal protection principles but would lead to the perverse result that both 
Government and criminal defense attorneys would plot to finagle their way into the determinate system or 
indeterminate system depending on the judge and the various factors relevant to the particular defendant’s 
sentence.”).  
Thus, confusion may endure even after the Supreme Court rules.  For example, if the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines fall, is the system that remains an unguided but determinate one (presumably with 
up to 15% reductions for good time) or an unguided indeterminate one with parole release?  See United 
States v. Mueffleman, No. 01-CR-10387-NG, Memorandum and Order re: United States Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Blakely v. Washington, Slip-op at 38 (July 26, 2004) (“I conclude that the elimination of 
parole was part of a comprehensive Guidelines system and not severable.  At the same time, since no 
parole system is currently in place, I will take that into account in determining sentencing ranges.  I will 
8Despite Blakely’s freshness, several insightful commentaries have already been 
penned cataloging many of Blakely’s consequences and potential consequences.23
Given that, I will not dwell on the current chaos it has injected into the federal 
sentencing system.  The relevant question now is the future of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines after Blakely.
III.  The Future of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Although the initial judicial opinions and academic prognosticating seem to 
foretell the demise of the United States Sentencing Guidelines as we know them,24 no 
one knows for certain.  In the words of one District Judge, “[a]s Mark Twain observed 
in 1897 that ’the reports of my death are greatly exaggerated,’ the Sentencing 
Guidelines may similarly defy present expectations of their impending demise.”25  Yet, 
we need not to go back to the time of Samuel Langhorne Clemens to grasp the 
uncertainty that lies before us.  All we need to do is remember the world before June 24, 
2004.  In that world, many commentators on and observers of criminal sentencing were 
assume that a defendant will serve virtually all of the term of imprisonment I am imposing.”) (citations 
omitted).  If the Supreme Court strikes down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines but does not fully address 
the severability issues, the uncertainty in the lower courts will not abate any time soon.  Under that 
scenario, Congress may feel greater pressure to step in quickly with a fix.  Quick Congressional fixes on 
criminal justice issues do not have a particularly illustrious pedigree.
23 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 316 (2004); 
Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 333 (2004).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1535858 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Croxford, 
2004 WL 1551564 (D. Utah 2004); King & Klein, supra note 23, at ___.
25 United States v. Olivera-Hernandez, No. 2:04CR0013, Order, Slip-Op at 5 (July 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/reports/olvera-hernandez.pdf; see also Pamela Manson, Judge: 
Sentencing Guidelines to Stay, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, July 13, 2004, available at 
http://166.70.44.66/2004/Jul/07132004/utah/utah.asp. 
9lulled into thinking that Blakely would be a non-event.26  So, the wisest course would be 
to tread lightly in predicting how the Supreme Court will deal with the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in a post-Blakely world.
A.  Drawing Lines in the Sand
Can the Federal Sentencing Guidelines be distinguished from the Washington 
State guidelines?  Many courts and commentators think not.27  Although it is possible to 
draw lines between these two sentencing schemes, should those lines matter?  Might the 
differences in the two systems prove to be important?  Distinctions have been 
highlighted by the Second Circuit in an opinion certifying Blakely questions to the 
26 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as a Structural 
Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 (2003) (noting that Harris v. United States
“implicitly held that judges can find facts that raise sentencing guidelines ranges, as the fact at issue in 
Harris raised Harris’s guidelines sentence by two years,” although acknowledging that the Court had 
granted cert. in Blakely).  Cf. Bibas, supra note 11, at 79 (“And the irony is that Justice Antonin Scalia, 
the only Justice who voted to strike down the Sentencing Guidelines fourteen years ago, provided the 
fifth vote that ensures that the Guidelines will survive today.”); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding 
Boundaries of “Apprendi-Land”; Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 377, 427 (2002) (“While the Court seems very unlikely to extend Apprendi to the Guidelines, 
especially in light of Harris, this article considers the ultimate fate of the Guidelines to be the most 
challenging post-Apprendi conundrum.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s 
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 103 (2003) (“Unless the 
Court shifts gears in Blakely and distinguishes mandatory minimums from binding sentencing guidelines, 
a legislature is free to raise statutory maxima as high as it wants--subject only to the Eighth Amendment 
and the political process itself--and then allow mandatory minimums and Sentencing Guidelines to do all 
the real work of sentencing.”); id. at 105 (“Barring a change of course in Blakely, a legislature can 
increase the overall statutory maxima and use sentencing guidelines to dictate sentences for specific 
conduct.”).
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER co-Managing Editor Professor Douglas Berman was 
suspicious that the Supreme Court was up to something.  The week before the decision came down, on 
June 18, he speculated on his blog, Sentencing Law and Policy, that “the decision might prove to be . . . a 
blockbuster along the lines of Ring v. Arizona[, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)], and not a big nothing like 
Harris v. United States. Stay Tuned.”   Sentencing Law and Policy, “Blakely Blockbuster?,” at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/06/blakely_blockbu.html.  
27 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1535858 (7th Cir.  2004); King & Klein, supra note 
23, at ___.
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Supreme Court,28 and by Judge Frank Easterbrook in his dissent in United States v. 
Booker.29
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Penaranda, 30 raised the question of 
whether the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s nature and role distinguished the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines from the Washington State guidelines.  The Penaranda Court 
did not resolve the question of Blakely’s applicability to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines as it chose to certify questions to the Supreme Court.31  Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit observed that a common feature of cases like Apprendi and Blakely is 
“that a state legislature had made the critical decisions setting the boundaries that the 
Court held the sentencing judge was not permitted to exceed without either a jury’s fact-
finding or a defendant’s admission.”32 It noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
while issued pursuant to a statute, and acting like laws “are not themselves prescribed 
by statute.”33  The Penaranda Court stated that the Supreme Court has previously 
described the Guidelines as “’the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal 
agencies.’”34 Similarly, it observed that “the distinct administrative provenance of the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines may place them outside the ambit of the Blakely 
28 United States v. Penaranda, 2004 WL 1551369 (2d Cir. July 12, 2004) (in banc).
29 2004 WL 1535858 at *9 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
30 2004 WL 1551369  (2d Cir. July 12, 2004) (in banc).
31 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and took the view that the 
“United States Code, and not the Guidelines, establishes maximum sentences for offenses.”  United 
States v. Pineiro, 2004 WL 1543170, at *9 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).  Ironically, given the 
supreme formalism of the Blakely decision, some courts have rejected this view as itself being “overly 
formalistic.”  United States v. King, No. 6:04-cr-35-Orl-31KRS, Sentencing Memorandum Opinion, Slip-
op at 6, n.11 (July 19, 2004).
32 Penaranda, 2004 WL 1551369 at *4.
33 Id. at *5.
34 Id. (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)).
11
principle.”35  In other words, the Second Circuit asked whether perhaps the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are not statutes and, if so, whether that distinction matters in the 
context of a Sixth Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit pointed to the structural composition of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent entity located in the Judicial Branch.36
This, too, makes it less likely that the federal Guidelines are statutes.  Finally, it 
recounted that in Mistretta v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected both the 
argument that “Congress combined legislative and judicial power within the Judicial 
Branch,”37 and that Congress improperly delegated its authority to the Sentencing 
Commission.38 While avoiding resolution of this important question (and marshaling 
counterarguments), the Penaranda Court noted that the fact “[t]hat the Sentencing 
Guidelines are not promulgated by Congress could prove critical to the determination of 
whether or not they are affected by Blakely.”39
Judge Easterbrook took a similar, but more aggressive, stance.  As part of his 
Booker dissent, Judge Easterbrook asserted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
survive Blakely.40  He argued that the Guidelines are not Blakely “statutory maximums” 
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 394.
38 Penaranda, 2004 WL 1551369, at *5
39 Id.
40 2004 WL 1535858, at *9 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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because the Guidelines are not statutes.  The Booker majority rejected this view,41 but 
Judge Easterbrook’s argument deserves further examination.  He said:
Blakely arose from a need to designate one of two statutes as the “statutory 
maximum.”  Washington called its statutes “sentencing guidelines,” but names 
do not change facts.  Nonetheless, the reading my colleagues give to this 
passage is that it does not matter whether the maximum is statutory; any legal 
rule, of any source (statute, regulation, guideline) that affects a sentence must go 
to a jury.  Certainly Blakely does not hold that; it could not “hold” that given 
that it dealt with statutes exclusively.  Attributing to Blakely the view that it does 
not matter whether a given rule appears in a statute makes hash of “statutory 
maximum.”  Why did the Justices deploy that phrase in Apprendi and repeat it in 
Blakely (and quite a few other decisions)?  Just to get a chuckle at the expense of 
other judges who took them seriously and thought that “statutory maximum” 
might have something to do with statutes?42
The United States, in its amicus brief in Blakely, presented arguments consistent 
with both Judge Easterbrook’s position in support of the Guidelines and the Second 
Circuit’s comments discussed above.  The government argued that “[t]here are possible 
distinctions between the federal guidelines and the state statutory systems.  Most 
prominently, the federal guidelines are promulgated by an administrative commission, 
not by Congress.”43  On this basis, the Solicitor General argued that:
The Guidelines are thus not statutes but sentencing rules, the unique product of a 
special and limited delegation of authority to the Commission.  “Congress 
granted the Commission substantial discretion in formulating guidelines.”  
[Mistretta, 488 U.S.] at 377.  Because Congress entrusted to the Commission the 
specification of the numerous facts that authorize differing punishments under 
the Guidelines, there is a strong argument that the Guidelines do not implicate 
41 Id. at *2 (“The Commission is exercising power delegated to it by Congress, and if a legislature 
cannot evade what the Supreme Court deems the commands of the Constitution by a multistage 
sentencing scheme neither, it seems plain, can a regulatory agency.”).
42 Id. at *9.
43
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, United States v. Blakely, 
No. 02-1632, 2004 WL 177025, at *9.  See also id. at *26 (“[U]nlike the Washington system, the federal 
Guidelines are not enacted by a legislature but are promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, ‘an 
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. 991(a); see Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989).”). 
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the concerns addressed by Apprendi. . . .  [T]hose concerns arise only when the 
legislature itself dictates the facts that control a defendant’s increased exposure 
to punishment, thereby effectively creating enhanced crimes.  . . .   There is thus 
good reason to conclude that the Guidelines “do not *** establish[] minimum 
and maximum penalties” for crimes.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396.44
We can expect to hear similar arguments from the United States in its merit briefs for 
Booker and Fanfan.
The government did, however, acknowledge in its Blakely amicus brief that the 
“administrative nature of the Guidelines” is not necessarily a complete protection 
against Apprendi, and, by implication, now against Blakely.45  The Solicitor General 
quoted from Mistretta for the proposition that the Commission “’is fully accountable to 
Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit.’”46  The 
government then, to its credit, specifically acknowledged that in the PROTECT Act, 
“Congress has in fact exercised its authority to amend the Guidelines.”47  Indeed, as 
described below, the PROTECT Act presents a high – and perhaps insurmountable –
hurdle for the government to clear in Booker and Fanfan.
 While the government may offer other potential justifications to uphold the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines despite Blakely, this administrative Guidelines rationale 
can be boiled down to two related arguments.  First, the Guidelines survive Blakely
because, unlike the Washington State guidelines, they are not statutory laws enacted by 
Congress.  Second, the Guidelines are constitutional because they were promulgated by 
44 Id.  at *26-27.
45 Id.  at *30.
46 Id.  (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-394).
47 Id.
14
an independent commission located in the Judicial Branch.  Both of these claims are 
factually questionable because of the PROTECT Act.
B.  The PROTECT Act Blurs the Lines
In April 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act.48  This legislation was 
primarily designed to help investigate and prosecute cases of child abduction.  
However, the PROTECT Act included a last minute addition that revamped federal 
sentencing law.  In these sentencing provisions, Congress took several steps to increase 
the power of the Department of Justice – at the expense of both the United States 
Sentencing Commission and federal district judges – to set criminal sentences.
By passing the PROTECT Act, Congress derided the roles of both the 
Commission and the judges.  In addition to sharply limiting the ability of judges to 
depart downward (but not upward), Congress stepped into the shoes of the Commission 
to re-write specific Guidelines text, prevented the Commission from making various 
new Guidelines, and limited the involvement of judges on the Commission itself.  The 
sentencing provisions of the PROTECT Act have had a tremendous impact – both 
substantively and psychologically – on the federal sentencing world.49  While some 
commentators at the time saw the PROTECT Act as “eviscerat[ing] a crucial 
48 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 667 (April 30, 2003).
49 David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial 
Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 231-232 (2004) (“[T]hese changes are symbolically 
important because they illustrate just how Congress has abandoned its original conception of the 
Sentencing Commission.”).
15
component of the [federal] sentencing system,”50 perhaps no one realized that the 
PROTECT Act might turn against the Congress and be part of the downfall of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines themselves. 
In late March 2003, acting at the urging of the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee and the Department of Justice, Representative Tom Feeney of Florida 
introduced an amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives that became 
known as the Feeney Amendment.51  Introduced with virtually no notice and approved 
with little debate in the House, the Feeney Amendment proposed to radically re-write 
federal sentencing law in part by severely curtailing the power of federal judges to 
depart downward.  Strong protest followed.52  While the sentencing provisions
ultimately incorporated into the PROTECT Act were somewhat milder than the original 
Feeney Amendment, the changes to the landscape of federal sentencing were still 
dramatic and unprecedented in the Guidelines era.53
For post-Blakely purposes, the sentencing provisions of the PROTECT Act 
made three important changes in federal sentencing law.  Each of these changes 
arguably reflected unfortunate “firsts” in the era of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  
First, Congress directly amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by drafting 
50 Letter from Law Professors to Senators Hatch and Leahy (April 2, 2003), reprinted at 15 FED. 
SENT. REP. 351, 351 (2003) (criticizing the PROTECT Act’s restrictions on downward departures).
51 Zlotnick, supra note 49, at 229.
52 See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, The Return of Hammurabi, 26 PLW 390 (2003) (“The U.S. 
Senate and President George W. Bush should reject the Feeney Amendment.”); Letter from Law 
Professors to Senators Hatch and Leahy (April 2, 2003), reprinted at 15 FED. SENT. REP. 351, 351 (2003) 
(“As law teachers, most of whom specialize in criminal law and procedure, we write to express our deep 
concerns regarding the Feeney Amendment to H.R. 1104.”).
53 Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 310 (2003) (describing 
the sentencing portion of the PROTECT Act as “containing the most far-reaching changes to the federal 
sentencing laws since the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines”).
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Guidelines text.54  In the past, Congress often had been content to issue directions to 
and requests for study from the Commission, but left it to the Commission to craft 
specific Guidelines text.55 This time, Congress completely ignored the expert role the 
Sentencing Commission was designed to play, cut the Commission out of the process 
entirely, and directly wrote Guidelines text to its own specifications.56   Congress went 
so far as to write Commentary for its new Guidelines.57
54 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b), (g), (i); Zlotnick, supra note 49, at 232 (noting that the 
PROTECT Act “was the first time that Congress actually wrote Guidelines language itself”).
55 See Zlotnick, supra note 49, at 232 n.144 (2004) (“Other bills directed the Commission to 
implement policy goals but stayed away from mandating offense levels and writing specific language for 
the Commission to incorporate.”).  However, Congress has previously instructed the Commission to 
increase offense levels in particular ways.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 71-72 
(1991) (summarizing directives).  For example, Congress did direct the Commission to add specific 
offense characteristics for the offense of kidnapping, abduction or unlawful restraint, and specified the 
extent of the offense level increases for those characteristics.  Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 401.  Yet even in 
this example, unlike the PROTECT Act, the Commission was not simultaneously barred by statute from 
making other changes to the Guidelines that might mitigate the relevant sentence.  But cf. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 71 n.150 (1991) (noting that as “a policy matter, although not 
necessarily as a matter of law, the Commission generally viewed the directive as setting forth 
enhancements that it should neither reduce or exceed.”). Compare Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(2) 
(PROTECT Act) (“On or before May 1, 2005, the Sentencing Commission shall not promulgate any 
amendment to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, or official commentary of the Sentencing 
Commission that is inconsistent with any amendment made by subsection (b) or that adds any new 
grounds of downward departure to Part K of chapter 5.”); Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(3) (“With respect 
to cases covered by the amendments made by subsection (i) of this section, the Sentencing Commission 
may make further amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, or official commentary of 
the Sentencing Commission, except that the Commission shall not promulgate any amendments that, with 
respect to such cases, would result in sentencing ranges that are lower than those that would have applied 
under such subsection.”).
Furthermore, although Congress had never directly written Guidelines text before, it had rejected 
Commission-drafted Guidelines on rare occasion.  For example, Congress previously rejected the 
Sentencing Commission’s efforts to alter the 100 to 1 powder to crack cocaine sentencing differential. 
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (1997), reprinted at 10 FED. SENT. REP. 184, 184 (1998).
56 See, e.g., Letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 
(April 3, 2003), reprinted at 15 FED. SENT. REP. 343, 343 (2003) (“Neither the Judicial Conference nor 
the Sentencing Commission has been given a fair opportunity to consider and comment on this 
proposal.”).
57 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g).
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Second, Congress prohibited the Sentencing Commission from creating certain 
new Guidelines.  Specifically, Congress barred the Commission from changing some of 
Congress’s legislative additions to the Guidelines or adding any new grounds for 
downward departure until after May 1, 2005.58  Furthermore, Congress forever 
prevented the Commission from changing the acceptance-of-responsibility Guideline 
which Congress directly amended as part of the PROTECT Act.59  Former U.S. 
Attorney Alan Vinegrad noted that “the statute is the most significant effort to 
marginalize the role of the Sentencing Commission in the federal sentencing process 
since the Commission was created by Congress nearly 20 years ago.”60
Finally, Congress reduced the minimum number of judges required to be 
members of the Commission – to zero.61  Before the PROTECT Act, there needed to be 
at least three judges on the Commission.  After the PROTECT Act (though not 
applicable to the then-current judicial members of the Commission), there can be no 
more than three judges on the Commission.  Thus, there need not be any judges on the 
United States Sentencing Commission despite the fact that the Commission is located in 
the Judicial Branch of the government.62
58 Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(2).  Given the Commission’s typical amendment cycle, this 
prohibits most changes from taking effect until November 1, 2006.  In Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(3), 
Congress did allow the Commission to increase the punishment for child pornography (which Congress 
had increased by directly amending the Guidelines text) but not to decrease it.  
59 Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(4) (“At no time may the Commission promulgate any amendment 
that would alter or repeal the amendments made by subsection (g) of this section.”).
60 Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 310, 315 (2003).
61 Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(n).
62 Although not raised in Booker or Fanfan, the potential absence of judges from the United States 
Sentencing Commission presents another possible problem for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The 
Mistretta Court upheld the Guidelines in part because of the role played by the judiciary in formulating 
the Guidelines.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390-91.  The potential absence of that judicial involvement casts a 
separate shadow over the continued viability of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Cf. id. at 391 n. 17 
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The PROTECT Act is powerful evidence that the post-Blakely administrative 
distinction advocated by the Department of Justice – even if accepted as a matter of 
constitutional theory – may well be illusory as a factual matter.  It may be, as Judge 
Easterbrook contends, that Blakely’s “statutory maximum” relates to statutes and not to 
administrative Guidelines.  Yet, at least some of the text of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines has been written directly by Congress as part of a typical statute in the form 
of the PROTECT Act.63  Thus, that administrative feature may no longer fully describe 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  It may also be, as the Second Circuit wondered, that 
independent judicially-based sentencing commissions can promulgate sentencing 
guidelines like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines without offending the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution.  Yet, it is difficult to call the United States Sentencing 
Commission either particularly independent or particularly judicial when Congress has 
prevented it – by statute – from issuing certain Guidelines and permitted its judicial 
complement to be eliminated entirely.   
C.  Congress Starts to Line Up
Thus far, Congressional reaction to Blakely has included great concern, but little 
action.  In late July 2004, the Senate passed a concurrent resolution urging the Supreme 
Court to resolve the confusion surrounding Blakely as soon as possible, and essentially 
(“Indeed, had Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the 
Executive Branch, we might face the constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had 
assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute 
and the power to sentence within one Branch.”).
63 Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401; see also Bibas, supra note 23, at __  (noting PROTECT Act 
amendments to Guidelines “makes the Federal Guidelines look more like statutes.”).
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arguing that the Court should end that confusion by finding the Guidelines 
constitutional.64  For example, the resolution states that the “statutory maximum penalty 
is the maximum penalty provided by the statute defining the offense of conviction, 
including any applicable statutory enhancement, and not the upper end of the guideline 
sentencing range promulgated by the Sentencing Commission and determined to be 
applicable to a particular defendant.”65  The resolution describes the United States 
Sentencing Commission as being established as an “independent commission in the 
Judicial branch” without acknowledging that this judicial commission may now be 
devoid of judges, cannot pass certain kinds of Guidelines, and has had the text of its 
own Guidelines Manual re-written in detail by Congress without meaningful 
consultation.  
As part of the discussion of this July 2004 resolution, Senator Patrick Leahy 
lamented that “Congress has seriously undermined the basic structure and fairness of 
the Federal guidelines system through posturing and ideology.  . . . The culmination of 
these unfortunate trends was the so-called Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act, in 
which this Congress cut the Commission out altogether and rewrote large sections of 
the Guidelines manual, including commentary.”66  He went on to observe that “[i]t may 
be that the Blakely decision was occasioned in part by recent tinkering with the 
Sentencing Reform Act that went too far.”67  Senator Leahy’s insights are profound.  
64 S. Con. Res. 130 (Passed by the Senate July 21, 2004).
65 Id.
66 108 CONG. REC. S8573 (daily ed. July 21, 2004).
67 Id.
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Indeed, his concerns may find a receptive audience in the Supreme Court as it decides 
Booker and Fanfan.
IV.  Conclusion
The Supreme Court of the United States will soon tell us whether, and if so how, 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines survive Blakely.  Although the Guidelines have 
beaten the odds before, the smart money seems to be against them.68  The destruction of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as we now know them will not be the end of the 
world.  Viable options for structured sentencing exist.69  Yet the irony cannot be lost on 
Congress and the Department of Justice that their effort to further control federal 
sentencing through the PROTECT Act may well play a role in the demise of the 
sentencing system that both the Legislative and Executive Branches want to preserve.
In United States v. Green,70 Chief Judge Young described a series of objections 
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and, almost one week before Blakely, declared 
them unconstitutional.  Significantly, Chief Judge Young called the Feeney 
Amendment, which evolved into the relevant portions of the PROTECT Act, “the 
saddest and most counterproductive episode in the evolution of federal sentencing 
doctrine.”71  Given the strength of the competition, reasonable minds can clearly differ 
on whether the PROTECT Act is the saddest episode in the evolution of federal 
sentencing doctrine.  Nevertheless, Congress’s reckless disregard for the United States 
68 See, e.g., King & Klein, supra note 23, at __;  Bibas, supra note 23, at __.
69 See, e.g., King & Klein, supra note 23, at __;  Bibas, supra note 23, at __.
70 2004 WL 1381101 (D. Mass. 2004).
71 Id. at *12.
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Sentencing Commission and open contempt for the judiciary may indeed prove to be 
one of the most counterproductive acts in recent sentencing history.
